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 Abstract:
This paper studies the implications of cross-border ﬁnancial integration for ﬁnancial
stability when banks’ loan portfolios adjust endogenously. Banks can be subject
to sectoral and aggregate domestic shocks. After integration they can share these
risks in a complete interbank market. When banks have a comparative advantage
in providing credit to certain industries, they will exploit the enhanced risk sharing
opportunities through more specialization in lending. The enhanced concentration
in lending does not increase risk, because a well-functioning interbank market allows
to achieve the necessary diversiﬁcation. The greater need for risk sharing through
it increases, however, the risk of cross-border contagion. Better risk sharing and
greater risk of contagion tend to oﬀset each other and ﬁnancial integration improves
welfare since specialization beneﬁts are realized.
Keywords: Financial integration, specialization, interbank market, ﬁnancial con-
tagion
JEL Classiﬁcation: D61, E44, G21Non technical summary
A key beneﬁt of ﬁnancial integration is that it improves risk sharing across borders.
It reduces the impact of regional shocks on domestic consumption. Greater diversiﬁ-
cation through ﬁnancial markets at the same time also allows to realize specialization
beneﬁts at the regional or ﬁrm level. When diversiﬁcation of sectoral risks can be
achieved through integrated ﬁnancial markets regions or ﬁrms can focus on those
technologies in which they have a comparative advantage.
However, the ﬁnancial globalization of the recent decades has been driven to a
large extent by a greater integration of interbank markets. But interbank integration
not only provides greater scope for risk sharing. It also brings about the risk of cross
border ﬁnancial contagion. If the regional shock exceeds the risk bearing capacities
of a regional bank it fails. Due to interbank credit exposures the failure of a regional
bank can lead to knock-on eﬀects across borders. Thus from a welfare perspective
ﬁnancial integration is only beneﬁcial if the expected beneﬁts from greater risk-
sharing exceed the expected costs from cross-border ﬁnancial contagion. In this
paper we develop a theoretical model to study this trade-oﬀ.
In our model we take into account that an integrated interbank market leads to
greater specialization in banks’ loan portfolio and thereby increases endogenously
both, the beneﬁts from risk sharing as well as the expected costs from ﬁnancial
contagion. If the interbank market is not integrated, banks have to cushion sectoral
shocks through diversiﬁcation of their loan books. They cannot share the risk of
delayed loan repayments with banks abroad. Thus it is not optimal for banks to
fully exploit the greater returns from specialization in the industry in which they
have a comparative advantage, because the greater concentration in lending would
expose them too much to sectoral shocks. If there is an integrated interbank market
available the diversiﬁcation of liquidity shocks is decoupled from the lending decision
of banks. It is optimal for banks to increase their investment in the high-return
industry, as the greater idiosyncratic exposure to sectoral shocks can be shared withbanks abroad. So, due to specialization in lending to diﬀerent sectors idiosyncratic
liquidity risks of banks increase and the beneﬁts from risk sharing endogenously rise.
At the same time, however, specialization makes banks more reliant on the liqui-
dity provision from the interbank market. When a specialized bank is hit by a
sectoral shock it is dependent on payments from the bank in the other country. If
this other bank is hit by a country-speciﬁc shock itself (or has some operational
problems), so that it is not in a position to make those payments, both banks will
ultimately default. The ﬁrst bank fails as a consequence of not receiving the expected
payments, which is a form of cross-border bank contagion. In this sense integration
and specialization endogenously increases contagion risk.
Assuming that country-speciﬁc (or operational) shocks are equally likely in all
countries and that they are uncorrelated with sectoral shocks, we can show that
the overall bank default risk before and after integration is unchanged. The greater
returns of enhanced specialization are realized, however, so that the overall return
of banks and ultimately also welfare increases through integration.
Of course, these results are derived under speciﬁc assumptions. In particular this
model does not consider the additional eﬀects of ﬁnancial regulation and supervision,
deposit insurance or a central bank acting as lender of last resort. It also abstracts
from the fact that large banking crises will have stronger negative externalities on
the real economy than small crises. Keeping these limitations in mind, at least one
lesson may be learnt. Financial integration should not simply be resisted on stability
grounds. Even though it enhances cross-border contagion risks, better risk sharing
has also oﬀsetting stability eﬀects and allows for exploiting further beneﬁts from
specialization, potentially leading to a higher level of welfare. All these arguments
should be considered.
3Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Finanzintegration verbessert die M¨ oglichkeiten zur grenz¨ uberschreitenden Risikotei-
lung. Sie reduziert hierdurch den Einﬂuss nationaler Schocks auf den inl¨ andischen
Konsum. Bessere Diversiﬁkationsm¨ oglichkeiten durch grenz¨ uberschreitende Finanz-
m¨ arkte erlauben dar¨ uber hinaus, Spezialisierungsvorteile auf regionaler Ebene bzw.
auf Firmenebene zu realisieren. Lassen sich sektorale Schocks auf einem integrierten
Finanzmarkt diversiﬁzieren, so k¨ onnen Regionen oder einzelne Firmen sich auf solche
Technologien spezialisieren, in denen sie einen komparativen Vorteil haben.
Die ﬁnanzielle Globalisierung der vergangenen Jahrzehnte war allerdings zu einem
Großteil durch die Integration der Interbankenm¨ arkte getrieben. Eine ﬁnanzielle
Integration ¨ uber Interbankenm¨ arkte erh¨ oht aber nicht nur das Potential der Risiko-
teilung. Sie bringt gleichzeitig auch grenz¨ uberschreitende Ansteckungsrisiken zwi-
schen Finanzinstituten mit sich. Ger¨ at eine Bank durch einen regionalen Schock in
eine Schieﬂage, so k¨ onnen hierdurch hervorgerufene Ausf¨ alle von Interbankkrediten
Banken anderer Regionen destabilisieren und letztlich zu Dominoeﬀekten f¨ uhren.
Aus einer Wohlfahrtsperspektive ist eine Finanzintegration ¨ uber den Interbanken-
markt demnach nur dann vorteilhaft, wenn die erwarteten Wohlfahrtsgewinne einer
verbesserten Risikoteilung die erwarteten Wohlfahrtskosten erh¨ ohter Ansteckungs-
risiken aufwiegen. In diesem Papier entwickeln wir ein theoretisches Modell, das
diesen Trade-oﬀ darstellt.
Unser Modell ber¨ ucksichtigt dabei explizit, dass integrierte Interbankenm¨ arkte
zu einer verst¨ arkten Spezialisierung im Kreditportfolio der Banken beitragen und
somit endogen sowohl die Vorteile der Risikoteilung als auch die erwarteten Kosten
aus Ansteckungseﬀekten steigen. Ist kein Interbankenmarkt verf¨ ugbar, so m¨ ussen
Banken ein sektoral diversiﬁziertes Kreditportfolio halten, um aus versp¨ ateten Kre-
ditr¨ uckzahlungen erwachsende Liquidit¨ atsrisiken abzufedern. Folglich k¨ onnen Ban-
ken Vorteile, die sich aus der Spezialisierung auf die Kreditvergabe an einzelne
Sektoren ergeben, nicht vollst¨ andig realisieren. Ist dagegen ein integrierter Inter-bankenmarkt verf¨ ugbar, so ist die Diversiﬁkation von Liquidit¨ atsrisiken unabh¨ angig
von der Kreditvergabe der Banken m¨ oglich. In diesem Fall ist es f¨ ur Banken opti-
mal, sich auf die Kreditvergabe an diejenigen Sektoren zu konzentrieren, die regional
den h¨ ochsten Ertrag versprechen. Hieraus resultierende idiosynkratische Liquidi-
t¨ atsschocks k¨ onnen ¨ uber den integrierten Interbankenmarkt mit Banken anderer
Regionen abgesichert werden. Die Spezialisierung des Kreditportfolios der Banken
f¨ uhrt dazu, dass idiosynkratische Liquidit¨ atsrisiken der Banken steigen und damit
endogen die Vorteile einer grenz¨ uberschreitenden Risikoteilung zunehmen.
Gleichzeitig f¨ uhrt eine st¨ arkere Spezialisierung der Kreditvergabe dazu, dass
Banken in gr¨ oßerem Maße von der Liquidit¨ atsbereitstellung ¨ uber den Interbanken-
markt abh¨ angig werden. Wenn eine spezialisierte Bank von einem negativen sek-
toralen Schock getroﬀen wird, ben¨ otigt sie eine Liquidit¨ atsbereitstellung der Bank
einer anderen Region, die sich auf einen anderen Sektor spezialisiert hat. Ist diese
andere Bank aber zur gleichen Zeit von einem regionalen Schock betroﬀen oder hat
sie operative Probleme, so werden letztlich beide Banken ausfallen. Die erste Bank
ist zahlungsunf¨ ahig, da der erwartete Liquidit¨ atszustrom aus dem Interbankenmarkt
ausbleibt. Es kommt zu einem Ansteckungseﬀekt. In diesem Sinne f¨ uhrt die Inte-
gration der Interbankenm¨ arkte und die einhergehende Spezialisierung endogen auch
zu einem Anstieg der Ansteckungsrisiken.
Unter der Annahme, dass l¨ anderspeziﬁsche Schocks bzw. operative Probleme
¨ uber die Regionen hinweg gleich wahrscheinlich sind und nicht mit sektoralen Schocks
korreliert sind, zeigt sich, dass das individuelle Ausfallrisiko einzelner Banken von der
Integration ¨ uber Interbankenm¨ arkte unber¨ uhrt bleibt. Gleichwohl steigen durch die
Spezialisierung in der Kreditvergabe die erwarteten Bankertr¨ age und damit letztlich
auch die Wohlfahrt.
Diese Resultate sind nat¨ urlich zu einem Großteil von den speziﬁschen Annah-
men des Modells abh¨ angig. Dies gilt insbesondere, da in dem Modell Bankenre-
gulierung und -aufsicht, Einlagensicherung und die Zentralbank als Lender of Last
Resort außer acht gelassen werden. Dar¨ uber hinaus ber¨ ucksichtigt das Modell nicht,
5dass typischerweise die negativen Externalit¨ aten von umfassenden Bankenkrisen f¨ ur
die Realwirtschaft weit gr¨ oßer sind als bei regional begrenzten Bankinsolvenzen.
Trotz dieser Einschr¨ ankungen zeigt dieses Modell aber, dass eine Beurteilung der
Finanzintegration nicht alleine auf eine stabilit¨ atspolitische Perspektive im engeren
Sinne beschr¨ ankt werden sollte. Auch wenn die Finanzintegration Ansteckungs-
eﬀekte erh¨ oht, so verbessert sie andererseits die Risikoteilungsm¨ oglichkeiten und
erlaubt damit die Realisation von Spezialisierungsvorteilen, die letztlich zu einer




Large and complex ﬁnancial institutions increasingly dominate the ﬁnancial sys-
tems of industrial countries. Partly to further enhance scale, partly for domestic
competition policy and partly for diversifying revenue streams and risks, these ﬁ-
nancial institutions transact more and more across borders. They link the ﬁnancial
systems of diﬀerent countries and foster international ﬁnancial integration. By di-
versifying their risks more they improve the resilience of the international ﬁnancial
system against idiosyncratic shocks. At the same time, however, the risk of ﬁnan-
cial contagion is extended from the national level to the international arena. Due
to the international integration a default of one such institution can now have more
severe negative externalities on ﬁnancial intermediaries abroad. In practice, these
externalities may arise from direct exposures, from asymmetric information about
them or from large failures causing liquidity dry-ups in key markets.1 The increas-
∗We are grateful to Mark Flannery, Roman Inderst, Charles Kahn, Todd Keisters, Rafael Re-
pullo, David Skeie and Roald Versteeg for helpful comments. We also thank the participants of
the CFS-ECB-BdE Conference in Madrid, the ProBanker Symposium in Maastricht, the CEUS
Workshop in Vallendar, the European Economic Associations Meeting in Budapest, German Eco-
nomic Association Meeting in Munich, 10th Bundesbank Spring Conference ”Central Banks and
Globalisation” and the seminar participants at the Bank of England, the ECB, the FED New
York, the IWH in Halle, the University of Mannheim and the University of Mainz. The views ex-
pressed by the authors do not necessarily reﬂect those of the European Central Bank, the Deutsche
Bundesbank or the Eurosystem.
1An early case of international ﬁnancial contagion due to direct exposures was the Herstatt
crisis in 1974. A more recent example of international systemic risk related to market illiquidities
was the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in 1998. For a discussion of these and
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ing cross-border activities and risk exposures of major ﬁnancial intermediaries are
particularly challenging, as the main regulatory and supervisory setups in banking,
securities and insurance business remain predominantly at the national level, and
therefore may not be able to eﬀectively address cross-border contagion risk.
Theoretical studies that deal with this trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts from diver-
siﬁcation and the expected costs from ﬁnancial contagion focus on the integration
through the interbank market, because banks remain at the core of ﬁnancial sys-
tems and tend to be particularly linked among each other. For a number of reasons
(large and complex ﬁnancial conglomerates, trading links between diﬀerent types of
ﬁnancial institutions, e.g., through new credit risk transfer markets, or banks’ prime
broker activities for hedge funds), however, the analysis carries over to other large
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Moreover, the last one and a half decades have witnessed
exponential growth of cross-border bank activities (see ﬁgure 1). The overwhelming
part of this is constituted of interbank assets and liabilities.
Previous studies of the welfare implications of integrated interbank markets,
however, took the corporate lending behavior of banks as given. This implies that
2the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks across regions is not aﬀected by ﬁnancial
integration.2 This assumption is problematic because one should expect that the
portfolios of ﬁnancial institutions react to the openness of ﬁnancial markets. In
order to fully evaluate the allocative eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration one needs to
endogenize the loan portfolios of domestic or international banks.
In this paper we follow this idea. We analyze the welfare eﬀects of ﬁnancial
integration taking into account that the improved scope for risk sharing through
integrated ﬁnancial markets aﬀects banks’ specialization which in turn inﬂuences
the cross-country distribution of bank speciﬁc shocks. More precisely, we develop a
model in which each local bank has a comparative advantage in lending to a spe-
ciﬁc sector because this sector is most productive in the respective bank’s country.3
Since the timing of loan repayments is uncertain across sectors a trade-oﬀ between
specialization in lending and diversifying risks arises.
Our main results are the following: As the scope for diversiﬁcation through an
interbank market improves, banks can increase their lending to the most proﬁtable
sector in their region, because the need to diversify through their loan portfolio
diminishes. This endogenously raises banks’ exposure to speciﬁc sectoral shocks
and further increases the need for diversiﬁcation through the interbank market.
2While Allen and Gale (2004a,b) and Fecht (2004) focus on interrelations between banks through
the general asset market, Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000), Fecht and
Gr¨ uner (2006), as well as Fecht, Gr¨ uner, and Hartmann (2007) focus on the interbank deposit
market. All of these studies assume a given distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks.
In contrast, two papers analyze the impact of interbank markets on banks’ investment choices,
focusing on moral hazard problems and the incentives for peer monitoring. Rochet and Tirole
(1996) assess the incentives for peer monitoring in order to draw conclusions about the scope for a
system-wide banking crisis in this context. Freixas and Holthausen (2004) discuss the implications
of greater asymmetric information about foreign compared to domestic banks for the structure and
integration of an interbank market. None of these two papers, however, focus on the relationship
between interbank market integration and cross-border contagion.
3See Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006) for empirical evidence of these specialization beneﬁts
in banking.
3Thus, the more pronounced is the specialization in the loan book the greater is the
need for risk sharing and the more reliant are regional ﬁnancial institutions on a
well-functioning integrated interbank market. But if banks rely to a larger extent
on the interbank market to buﬀer liquidity shocks the risk of contagion grows. If the
sector in which one bank is specialized in suﬀers from an adverse liquidity shock,
this bank might not be able to raise the needed liquidity in the integrated interbank
market, if the foreign bank is at the same time hit by a domestic shock, for instance,
due to an operational problem. In that way the failure of one bank as a consequence
of a severe domestic shock is transmitted over an integrated interbank market to
banks across borders and might ultimately destabilize banks that were initially not
aﬀected by the shock.4
Two important questions are what are the eﬀects of these implications of ﬁnan-
cial integration on overall stability and welfare. As regards ﬁnancial stability, the
severity of idiosyncratic risk exposure increases due to the greater specialization but
the enhanced risk sharing through the interbank market more than compensates
for it. In contrast, the channel for cross-border contagion further enhances banks’
default risk. However, in our model the higher systemic risk is exactly oﬀset by
the lower exposure to domestic shocks. Thus while individual banks’ default prob-
ability remains unaﬀected, the risk of a correlated banking crisis increases. As long
as wide-spread banking crisis are not more costly than national banking crisis the
economic welfare overall improves because of the beneﬁts from specialization. In
sum, the changes induced by ﬁnancial integration on the lending behavior of banks
have important implications for the relationship between integration and stability
and for welfare.
There is a developing, primarily empirical literature about the beneﬁts and costs
of ﬁnancial globalization and capital account liberalization. One part of this lit-
erature suggests that countries with sound macroeconomic policies, good economic
4It is interesting to note that this channel of interbank contagion is not based on the loss of
interbank deposits as in Allen and Gale (2000) or Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000).
4institutions, advanced ﬁnancial development and openness as well as good human
capital (i.e. industrial countries and, perhaps, a few advanced emerging market
countries) are able to reap the risk sharing beneﬁts of international ﬁnancial inte-
gration, whereas countries that are below certain levels for these variables (i.e. most
developing and emerging market countries) are not able to beneﬁt.5 The small part
of this literature most closely related to our work asks how ﬁnancial openness or the
presence of capital controls aﬀects the likelihood of ﬁnancial crises. Despite concerns
sometimes raised in policy circles, there does not seem to be systematic evidence
suggesting that greater ﬁnancial integration increases the likelihood of crises, quite
the contrary.6 Still, particularly in developing countries weak ﬁnancial supervision,
contract enforcement problems and unsound macroeconomic policies may sometimes
adversely interact with too fast ﬁnancial liberalization and thereby contribute to ﬁ-
nancial instability.7 There is also some evidence that cross-border contagion risks
5See, for example, the two recent surveys by Henry (2006) and Kose, Prasad, Rogoﬀ, and
Wei (2006). Stulz (2005) discusses the agency problems that hinder less developed countries from
reaping the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001, 2005 and 2006)
and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2006) ﬁnd even more generally valid positive eﬀects of
equity market liberalizations. Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) estimate that banking integration
through the removal of branching restrictions in the United States reduced and aligned state-level
business cycles, as measured by gross state product, employment and personal income growth.
Matsuyama (2007) presents a broad theoretical framework.
6Controlling for selection bias, Glick, Guo, and Hutchison (2006) estimate that countries with
fewer restrictions on capital ﬂows experience a smaller probability of currency crises than coun-
tries that restrict capital ﬂows more. Bonﬁglioli and Mendicino (2004) ﬁnd that the frequency of
banking crises is about the same in countries with capital controls and restrictions on equity trans-
actions as it is in countries without such controls and restrictions. Moreover, the adverse eﬀects of
banking crises on economic growth turn out to be less severe in countries with less restricted capital
accounts. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial liberalizations increase the
likelihood of banking crises, but they only consider domestic interest rate liberalizations and they
do not look at the removal of restrictions on foreign capital. See Ferguson, Hartmann, Panetta,
and Portes. (2007) for a review and similar results from estimations using de facto measures of
integration rather than de jure measures of capital controls.
7See for example Eichengreen, Mussa, DellArriccia, Detragiache, Milesi-Ferretti, and Tweedie
5among industrial countries are increasing in conjunction with the ﬁnancial integra-
tion process.8 Hence, also the available empirical research suggests that the welfare
analysis of international ﬁnancial integration needs to consider both eﬃciency and
stability implications.9
The relationship between eﬃciency and stability implications of ﬁnancial inte-
gration emphasized in our paper is strongly related to the one put forward in Allen
and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000). They also show that ﬁnan-
cial integration through the interbank market allows to diversify regional liquidity
shocks eﬃciently while entailing the risk of ﬁnancial contagion between banks from
diﬀerent regions. But they do not allow for the important endogenous response of
bank balance sheets, in particular specialization in lending. Moreover, while in their
model liquidity shocks result from stochastic withdrawals of depositors, in our model
liquidity shocks stem from uncertainty in the timing of loan repayments (similar to
the assumptions underlying Diamond and Rajan (2005)). Non-performing loans are
often not defaulting loans but are repaid later than expected, thereby constituting
an important liquidity risk.
Our paper is also related to a literature on the relative beneﬁts of bank diver-
siﬁcation. Hanson, Pesaran, and Schuermann (2005) suggest that the scope for
the international diversiﬁcation of credit risk is substantial. Winton (1999), how-
ever, warns on theoretical grounds that reduced incentives for monitoring borrowers
may oﬀset prima facie asset diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. DeLong (2001) ﬁnds that the
announcement eﬀects of bank mergers that are focused in both activity and geogra-
phy suggest more creation of stockholder value than other types of mergers. These
results are also consistent with our result that greater specialization through cross-
border integration and diversiﬁcation through the interbank market may be welfare
(1998), Williamson and Mahar (1998) or Ishii and Habermeier (2002) for broad overviews and
policy discussions.
8See Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2005), Degryse and Nguyen (2006) and van Lelyveld
and Liedorp (2006).
9See also Tirole (2002) and Eichengreen (2003).
6improving.
Last, the paper is related to an earlier debate about optimal currency areas.
In this debate it was a widely held argument that the criteria of what constitutes
an optimal currency area is endogenous. According to the main proponents of that
view–Frankel and Rose (1998)–the deeper economic integration that goes along with
a greater monetary integration aﬀects the correlation of business cycles across mem-
ber countries which in turn aﬀects the costs of a common monetary policy. One
important eﬀect that these authors stress is that by reducing obstacles to interna-
tional trade a monetary union 1) enables countries to capture beneﬁts from com-
parative advantages whether they are due to technological diﬀerences, diﬀerences
in factor endowments or whether they result from economies of scale, 2) fosters
national specialization and 3) ultimately leads to less correlated business cycles.
Similarly, in a recent study Heathcote and Perri (2004) showed that in the course
of ﬁnancial globalization the correlation of the U.S. business cycle with the rest of
the world has declined. However, they argue that ﬁnancial globalization ampli-
ﬁed an exogenous reduction in the correlation of productivity shocks by enlarging
cross-border capital ﬂows. More related to our view Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and
Yosha (2003) provide evidence that indeed a deeper integration of international as-
set markets improves cross-regional risk sharing and leads to greater specialization
in production as ﬁrst supposed by Helpman and Razin (1978).
2 Assumptions
Consider a three period economy t =0 ,1,2 consisting of regions j ∈{ A;B}.I n
each region there is a continuum of households with the same utility function:
U (c1;c2)=c1 + c2.
Thus households are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In t = 1 a fraction q>1/2 of households receives the blueprint of a production
7technology which produces a return X>1i nt = 2. This investment opportunity
is not publicly observable and is only available to the respective household.
In each region there is one bank operating. Apart from a storage technology that
allows to transfer funds from one period to the next without paying any interest,
banks have two investment technologies available, that diﬀer in their regional return.
Technology S produces a region speciﬁc return Sj for each unit invested in t =0a n d
technology R produces a return Rj, with X>R j,S j > 1. Banks can only invest in
their home region. It is uncertain when exactly the return of both technologies will
be realized. Therefore banks face a liquidity risk. With probability e sector R is hit
by a shock and the investments in this technology cannot be realized before t =2
while the returns from technology S are realized in t = 1. With the same probability
a sectoral shock hits sector S and technology S produces late while technology R is
early. We assume that region A has an advantage in technology S while region B
has the same advantage in using technology R:
SB = RA <R B = SA
On the one hand these regional advantages in the return from the two investment
technology can be explained by diﬀerences in the resources available in the two
regions. On the other hand it can also reﬂect specialization of regional banks in
lending to diﬀerent sectors. When liquidated before maturity the return of both
technologies is   ≈ 0.10
In addition to sectoral shocks, with probability f a regional shock hits either
region and both technologies in the respective region produce late, while only one
technology is late in the other region. We assume that the probability for such
10Note that our assumptions ensure for simplicity that banks can fully diversify sectoral liquidity
shocks. With a portfolio that fully diversiﬁes these shocks the cash-ﬂows generated in t = 1 and
in t = 2 are identical. To ensure that banks still have an incentive to hold liquidity we need to
assume q>1/2. Alternatively we could also assume that part of the returns on technology S and
R is always late, i.e. only realized in t = 2. This would clearly not aﬀect our results but make the
notation messier.
8a regional shock is close to zero. For simplicity we ﬁx the probability that both
technologies produce an early return at zero.11 The joint probability distribution of
return ﬂows (C1;C2)i nt =1a n dt = 2 in the two regions can be summarized by
the following table.
Region A
(RA;SA) (SA;RA) (0;SA + RA)
(RB;SB) e 0 f
Region B (SB;RB) 0 e f
(0;SB + RB) f f 0
Obviously,
2e +4 f =1 .
Banks can only raise funds from the households in their respective region. But
since we assume that the regional banking markets are contestable markets banks
are forced to oﬀer households the deposit contract that maximizes their expected
utility. A deposit contract promises a repayment d1 to all depositors that withdraw
in t = 1. The banks’ cash-ﬂow is not contractible but observable to depositors. If the
remaining assets after repaying d1 to impatient depositors are more then suﬃcient
to repay the patient depositors d2 = d1 in t = 2 then the bank’s remaining funds are
distributed to the patient depositors in t = 2. If the bank’s assets are insuﬃcient to
repay the impatient depositors d1 and patient ones d2 ≥ d1 in t = 2, late depositors
run to be ﬁrst in line to withdraw in t =1 . 12 We assume that patient and impatient
depositors have the same chance of getting a certain position in the line.
11A positive probability of early returns in both sectors would not aﬀect any of our results unless
this probability is too large.
12Here we simply assume that banks can only use deposit contracts that do not allow for a
suspension of convertibility. However, it is straightforward that a commitment problem of the
bank manager ` a la Diamond and Rajan (2001) could be easily integrated in this setting and
would endogenously derive a deposit contract including a sequential service constraint without a
suspension of convertibility as the optimal contractual arrangement.
93 Optimal allocation with separate banks
In this section we study the optimal allocation given that banks do not dispose of
any means to share risks across regions.
3.1 Diversiﬁed banks
First, we analyze the optimal investment portfolio and deposit contract of a bank
that runs the risk of becoming illiquid if its is hit by a regional shocks, but that
plans to honor the deposit contract in any other case. Without loss of generality we
focus on a bank operating in region A.
Deﬁne l0 as the fraction invested in t = 0 in liquidity holdings, k =1− l0 as
the fraction invested into the two production technologies, and xA the fraction of k
invested in the inferior production technology R.
Unless it is hit by a regional shock bank A can realize from each unit k of capital
investment a minimum t1-cash-ﬂow given by
Φ1 = Min[RAxA;SA (1 − xA)]. (1)
Given that bank A disregards the risks of a regional shock, the expression Φ1kA
gives the liquidity inﬂow from investments in the production technologies that the
bank can rely on in t = 1 when deciding about the optimal short-term repayment on
the deposit contract. Any additional liquidity inﬂow is only available in certain fa-
vorable states. It is not available with certainty to reﬁnance short-term repayments.
Thus if the bank wants to avoid ending up in a liquidity crisis due to sectoral shocks
it will not rely on those additional funds for the anticipated short-term withdrawals.
Instead it will store this extra liquidity for additional long-term repayments on de-
posit. Thus returns from production technologies available to reﬁnance d2 are given
by Φ2kA with
Φ2 = Max[RAxA;SA (1 − xA)]. (2)
10Thus a safe optimal deposit contract that an autarkic bank can always meet
except if it is hit by a regional liquidity shock solves (P1)
(P1)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
max
d1;d2;l0
2f (qX +( 1− q))l0 +( 2 e +2 f)(qXd1 +( 1− q)d2)
s.t. qd1 =Φ 1 (1 − l0)+l0 (BC1)
(1 − q)d2 =Φ 2 (1 − l0)( BC2)
d1 ≤ d2 (IC)
The bank maximizes depositors’ expected utility where by it runs the risk that
with probability 2f it will be hit by a regional shock. In that case the bank antici-
pates to have insuﬃcient cash in t = 1 to repay d1 to impatient depositors. Thus it
expects to be liquidated in which case it will be only able to repay on average the
per capita liquidity holding l0 to its depositors. Since in a run patient and impatient
households have the same chance of receiving a repayment on their deposits the ex-
pected utility from receiving a unit repaid in that state is given by (qX − (1 − q)).
In those states in which there is only a sectoral shock (happening with prob. 2e)
or in which the other region is hit be a region shock (prob. 2f) the bank plans to
repay the promised amount d1 to impatient and d2 to patient depositors. Impatient
depositors can use the proceeds received in t = 1 to apply their private technology
generating a return X>1i nt = 2 on each unit invested, while patient depositors
consume the repayment d2 in t =2 .
The budget constraint (BC1) ensures that the funds supposed to be repaid to
impatient depositors do not exceed the liquidity holding plus the t1-cash-ﬂow from
capital investment that is realized given no regional shock in region A.( BC2) pro-
vides that the cash-ﬂow available in t = 2 from late investment projects is suﬃcient
to repay patient depositors. The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) ensures
that patient depositors do not have an incentive to withdraw early.
Since X>1 the bank maximizes depositors’ utility by increasing as much as pos-
sible the short-term repayment on deposits. Thus for the optimal deposit contract
11(IC) holds with equality. It follows from (BC1) and (BC2) that
(1 − q)Φ 1 (1 − l0)+( 1− q)l0 = qΦ2 (1 − l0)




qΦ2 − (1 − q)Φ 1
qΦ2 − (1 − q)Φ 1 +( 1− q)
.
Reinserting in (BC1) and (BC2) yields
dD = d1 = d2 =
Φ2
qΦ2 − (1 − q)Φ 1 +( 1− q)
. (3)
From (1), (2), and (3) it is easy to see that for xA >S A/(RA + SA)
dD =
RAxA





−(1 − q)(SA − 1)RA
(qRAxA − (1 − q)SA (1 − xA)+( 1− q))
2 < 0.
It is also easy to see from (1), (2), and (3) that for xA <S A/(RA + SA)
dD =
SA (1 − xA)





(RA − 1)SA (1 − q)
qSA (1 − xA) − (1 − q)RAxA +( 1− q)
> 0.
So obviously , dD is maximized for ˆ xA = SA/(RA + SA). Obviously, for xA =ˆ xA the
bank fully diversiﬁes sectoral liquidity shocks and receives the same deterministic
cash ﬂow Φ in t =1a n dt = 2 given no regional shocks in region A:










(2q − 1) + (1 − q)Φ −1





(2q − 1) + (1 − q)Φ −1
Since ∂Φ/∂(SA/RA) < 0, it is easy to see that increasing beneﬁts from special-







Note that ˆ xA > 1/2. Thus a portfolio with fully diversiﬁed sectoral cash ﬂow
shocks implies that bank A has to invest a larger fraction of its capital in the inferior
technology RA in order to maximize the minimum period 1 return. Obviously, the
bigger the beneﬁts from specialization, i.e. the bigger SA/RA, the smaller is this
cash ﬂow of a portfolio that fully diversiﬁes sectoral shocks.
Lemma 1 The optimal deposit contract of a bank that wants to avoid a liquidity
shortage in all but those states in which it suﬀers from a regional shock is charac-
terized by d1 = d2 = d∗
D. The repayments on this optimal deposit contract decline
with increasing beneﬁts from specialization.
Given this maximum repayment that the bank can promise in t = 1 the expected
utility of households in the respective regions is
EU
D =2 f (qX +( 1− q))l
∗
0 +( 2 e +2 f)(qX +( 1− q))d
∗
D (4)
It is easy to see that bank B will oﬀer the same deposit contract and will hold the
same amount of liquidity as bank A. The only diﬀerence is that bank B will invest
more of its capital into technology S:ˆ xB =1− ˆ xA. Thus following this diversiﬁed
strategy both banks are forced to invest the larger fraction of their capital into the
technology in which they have a disadvantage.
133.2 Undiversiﬁed banks
Assume now that bank A follows a more risky strategy and oﬀers a deposit contract
that it can only honor if the regionally more productive technology S generates the
cash-ﬂow already in t = 1. This means that the bank anticipates to be liquidated
not only if a regional shock hits region A but also if technology S if aﬀected by a
sectoral shock. Since the liquidation value is zero for both production technologies
the portfolio decision xA does not matter for bankruptcy returns. The portfolio
decision only aﬀects the repayment on deposits in those states in which technology
S produces early returns. Since the bank can always shift resources between t =1
and t = 2 using the storage technology it is obviously optimal for the bank to invest





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
max
d1;d2;l0
(e +3 f)(qX +( 1− q))l0 +( e + f)(qXd1 +( 1− q)d2)
s.t. qd1 = SA (1 − l1)(1− l0)+l0 (BC1)
(1 − q)d2 = SAl1 (1 − l0)( BC2)
d1 ≤ d2 (IC)
The optimal deposit contract maximizes depositors expected utility given that
it can only repay the liquidation value l0 if sector S is hit by a sectoral shock (which
happens with prob. (e + f)) or region A is aﬀected by a regional shock (which
happens with prob. (2f)). In the run that leads to the liquidation, patient and
impatient depositors have the same chance of receiving their a repayment. Thus
the expected utility in this case is given by the weighted average of patient and
impatient depositors. Only if the sector S generates a early cash-ﬂow and region A
is not hit by a regional shock then the bank will provide the promised repayment
d1 and d2 on deposits, whereby impatient depositors receiving d1 have a marginal
beneﬁt of X>1 from repayments, while patient depositors who receive d2 have a
marginal utility of 1.
The budget constraint (BC1) in (P1 ) states that the repayments to impatient
14depositors must not exceed the liquidity holdings l0 of bank A plus a fraction (1 −
l1) of the cash-ﬂow generated from the investment in technology S. l1 measures
the fraction of the cash-ﬂow from capital investment that is not needed to repay
impatient depositors that is rather stored in reserves for one period to reﬁnance the
payment to patient depositors. Thus (BC2) requires that this stored cash-ﬂow is
suﬃcient for the required repayments to the patient depositors. (IC) again ensures
that patient depositors do not withdraw in t =1 .
The bank maximizes depositors utility in those states in which it remains solvent,
by repaying as much as possible to impatient depositors. Thus (IC) will hold with
equality and it follows from (BC1) and (BC2) that
(1 − q)SA (1 − l1)(1− l0)+( 1− q)l0 = qSAl1 (1 − l0).
Thus the optimal risky deposit contract is determined by
l1 =( 1− q)
SA (1 − l0)+l0
SA (1 − l0)
and
dU = SA (1 − l0)+l0.
This risky strategy provides depositors with an expected utility given by
EU





=[ ( e +3 f) − (e + f)(SA − 1)](qX +( 1− q)).
Consequently, the optimal risky strategy of an autarkic bank involves l0 =0i f
2f − (e + f)(SA − 2) < 0




15Thus assuming that (6) holds13 then the expected utility that can be archived
by the risky deposit contract d∗
U = SA is
EU
U =( e + f)(qX +( 1− q))SA. (7)
3.3 Safe banks
Alternatively the bank could also oﬀer a deposit contract that it could honor even
if it is hit by a regional shock. Obviously, in order to follow that strategy the bank
has to hold suﬃcient liquidity to repay early withdrawals even if both technologies
provide a late return. But given that it holds suﬃcient liquidity there is no need
for the bank to invest in a diversiﬁed portfolio. Thus following this strategy bank




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
max
d1;d2;l0
(2e +4 f)(qXd1 +( 1− q)d2)
s.t. qd1 = l0 (BC1)
(1 − q)d2 = SA (1 − l0)( BC2)
d1 ≤ d2 (IC)
A safe bank will always ((2e +4 f) = 1) repay d1 and d2 to its impatient and
patient depositors, respectively, whereby again the impatient ones have a marginal
utility of X>1 from each unit repaid, while patient depositors have only a marginal
utility of 1. To be able to always repay d1 the bank has to hold liquidity against
the early repayments, because only these funds are available with certainty in t =1 .
Thus (BC1) in (P1  ) ensures that the bank holds suﬃcient liquidity to reﬁnance
the repayment to impatient depositors. Since the short-term repayment are always
met by the liquidity holdings the bank invest all the funds that are used to reﬁnance
13Note that if (6) does not hold, then the bank would prefer to invest only in liquidity (l0 =1 )
which implies d = 1 and would make the bank redundant. The expected utility in that case is
EUA =( 2 e +4 f)(qX +( 1− q))
.
16the repayment to patient depositors in the most productive technology S. If this
technology is late it does not matter since the bank needs the fund only in t =2
to repay the patient depositors. If the technology generates an early cash-ﬂow the
bank will store the funds until t = 2. Obviously, any investment in technology R
would only reduce the possible payment to patient depositors. (IC) again ensures
that patient depositors keep their deposits until t =2 .














The expected utility from such a deposit contract is
EU
S =( 2 e +4 f)(qX +( 1− q))d
∗
S.
3.4 Optimal deposit contract
Now we turn to the question under which parameter setting the diﬀerent strategies
are optimal for the bank. We focus on parameter settings in which banks choose a
diversiﬁed portfolio and oﬀer d∗








Condition (8) requires that
(2e +4 qf)d
∗
D > (e + f)SA
which can be simpliﬁed to
2e +4 qf
e + f







17Thus separate banks prefer to diversify instead of specialize if 1) SA is not too large
and 2) the beneﬁts from specialization (SA/RA)a r en o tt o ol a r g e .
Condition (9) holds if
(2e +4 qf)d
∗













Therefore, banks will not follow the safe strategy but rather diversify if 1) SA is
not too large and 2) because of ∂Φ/∂(SA/RA) < 0 if the beneﬁts from specialization
are not too large.
Thus we can summarize the ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the advantages from specialization are not too large, then a sep-
arate bank will invest into a diversiﬁed portfolio of technology S and R. It invests
the larger fraction into the inferior technology.
4 Optimal allocation with integrated banks
In this section we ﬁrst derive the constraint eﬃcient allocation and then show to
what extent this constraint eﬃcient allocation can be implemented by an interbank
market.
4.1 The constraint eﬃcient allocation
Consider the allocation that a social planner would implement given that he also
cannot observe whether a speciﬁc household has a private investment opportunity or
not. Thus we look for the eﬃcient allocation under the constraint that it has to be
incentive compatible for patient households not to claim to be impatient. However,
the social planner can shift resources freely between regions. Thus he will obviously
18not invest in technologies RA and SB; he will only make use of the most productive
technologies SA and RB,w h e r e b ySA = RB.G i v e n t h a t f is suﬃciently low the
social planer will only diversify sectoral speciﬁc shocks. Thus the constraint eﬃcient
consumption allocation that a social planner will oﬀer solves (P2)
(P2)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
max
d1;d2;l0
2f (qXl0 + SA (1 − l0)) + (2e +2 f)(qXd1 +( 1− q)d2)
s.t. qd1 = SA (1 − l0)/2+l0 (BC1)
(1 − q)d2 = SA (1 − l0)/2( BC2)
d1 ≤ d2 (IC)
Since it is optimal for the social planner to fully smooth sectoral cash-ﬂow shocks,
he invests half of the capital investments (1 − l0) in technology SA and the other half
in technology RB.( BC1) requires that in both regions the repayments to impatient
depositors do not exceed the liquidity held by the planer per region plus half of the
early cash-ﬂow available in the economy. Given that sector S is early all cash-ﬂow
generated in the economy is produced by technology S in region A and half of these
returns are transferred by the social planer to the other region, while in contrast
half of the late produced cash-ﬂow from technology R in region B is transferred to
region A to be paid to the patient household in this region. Given that SA = RB
this is reﬂected in (BC2). In case of the opposite sectoral cash-ﬂow shock the cross-
regional transfers are simply reversed. Since we are assuming that also the social
planer cannot observe households’ idiosyncratic liquidity shocks (IC) has again to
be taken into account.
The social planer maximizes the expected utility of households in both regions.
Thereby he has to take into account that he will only be able to repay the planed
amounts d1 and d2 if the region in which the sector is located that is supposed to
produce early returns is not hit by a regional shock. With prob. 2e t h e r ei sn o
regional shock and with probability 2f there is only a regional shock in the region
with the production technology that is late anyway. Thus with prob. (2e +2 f)
the planer can pay d1 and d2 to the impatient and patient households, respectively.
19With prob. 2f,h o w e v e r ,t h er e g i o nA is hit by a regional shock when technology S
was producing early or region B has a shock when technology R should be early. In
these cases the social planer can only repay the liquidity holding to the impatient
households, while he can divide the entire return on capital investment SA (1 − l0)
by the (1 − q) patient households.14
Since f is assumed to be suﬃciently small the planner maximizes also the short-
term repayment to impatient households d1 because it generates the maximum ex-
pected marginal utility. Thus again (IC) holds with equality at the optimal deposit
contract it follows from (BC1) and (BC2) that
qSA (1 − l0)=( 1− q)SA (1 − l0)+( 1− q)2l0.





2(1− q)+( 2 q − 1)SA
,
and the optimal payment to patient and impatient households is
dI = d1 = d2 =
SA
2(1− q)+( 2 q − 1)SA
.




0 . Consequently, the social planer improves households’ welfare compared
to autarkic banks. He does not only avoid ineﬃcient liquidation but he also fully
reaps the beneﬁts of specialization.
4.2 Implementation through an interbank market
Now assume that there is an interbank market open in t = 1. In this interbank mar-
ket banks can trade liquidity against future cash-ﬂow from some capital investment
14Thus we implicitly assume that the social planner is not forced to liquidate assets when he
cannot meet the planed payment to impatient depositors. We rather assume that he suspends
payments when liquidity is insuﬃcient.
20at an equilibrium interest rate. Since there is no investment alternative to the stor-
age technology for excess liquidity in t = 1 (cash that is already available in t =1
but is only needed in t = 2 to reﬁnance the repayment to patient depositors) banks
will oﬀer any excess cash holdings in the interbank market at a riskless interest rate
i ≥ 0.
We assume that the initial liquidity holding (l0) are publicly observable and
veriﬁable and thus contractible in t = 0. This assumption can essentially be viewed
as reﬂecting regulatory liquidity requirements.15 However, investment portfolio (xj),
the deposit contract that banks oﬀer their respective regional depositors and the
realization of regional and sectoral liquidity shocks are not publicly observable.
Thus the interbank market is a Bayesian game with the following stages: In t =0
1) banks mutually sign a contract about their liquidity holdings, 2) individually
design a deposit contract that they oﬀer households in their region and 3) collect
deposits and invest them in a portfolio of technology S and R in their region. Then
in t = 1 liquidity shocks realize and dependent on their private liquidity shock banks
oﬀer or demand liquidity in the interbank market against repayment in t =2 .
It is easy to see that the cross-regional risk-sharing together with a fully special-
ized portfolio as derived in the previous subsection can be achieved in an equilibrium
of this Bayesian game. To prove this assume ﬁrst that banks oﬀer the optimal deposit
contract dI and agreed to hold lI
0 liquid reserves. Furthermore assume that both
banks are fully specialized in their respective most eﬃcient technology. In that case if
bank A (B) suﬀers from a liquidity shortage–either due to a sectoral shock to technol-






15Note also that we take this assumption to abstract from the usual underinvestment in liquidity
known from Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994). It is easy to
see that if banks could not verify each others initial liquidity holding also in this setting banks
would underinvest in liquidity and free ride on the liquidity provision of their counterparty. As our
focus is to show that contagion also occurs if the interbank market is most eﬃcient we abstract
from these market ineﬃciencies. Fecht and Gr¨ uner (2006) show that unsecured interbank deposits






RB/2) in the t = 1 interbank market and can promise to repay
this amount at t =2 .I fb a n kA (B) has excess liquidity because the technology S











RB/2). And banks will be willing to oﬀer their entire excess liq-
uidity in the market as long as they receive the same amount repaid in t = 2 since
their alternative would be to store the excess liquidity. Thus given that banks are
fully specialize the interbank market is a self revealing mechanism and ensures that
banks can sustain sectoral liquidity shocks.
The questions remains whether banks have an incentive to fully specialize or not.
Assume that bank A is less than fully specialized and holds a fraction xA > 0i n
technology R, while bank B is fully specialized. It is easy to see that bank A cannot
repay a deposit contract dI if technology S is hit by a liquidity shock because it can





(1 − xA)SA − dI/2 in the interbank market. Together





xARA this is insuﬃcient to repay
dI to the impatient depositors since RA <S A. Similarly, if technology S is early
and R late, the cash ﬂow available in t = 2 is lower than under full specialization
and insuﬃcient to repay the patient depositors dI. Thus a bank that is less than
fully specialized can only oﬀer a lower deposit contract than dI. Hence, with the
described interbank market available banks always have an incentive to self reveal
their regional liquidity shocks (oﬀer excess liquidity in the interbank market), will
fully specialize and will oﬀer the second best deposit contract.
With an interbank market the diversiﬁcation of liquidity risks is decoupled from
banks’ investment decision. Since bank A only invests in technology S and bank B
only in technology R while sectoral cash-ﬂow risks are diversiﬁed with the respective
interbank payments, banks in this case also oﬀer the same deposit contract as the
social planer does. Since dI >d ∗
D and lI
0 >l D
0 both banks therefore also provide
depositors with a higher expected repayment than autarkic diversiﬁed banks.
However, it is easy to see that banks following this strategy rely on the liquidity
provision through the interbank market in case the technology that they are spe-
22cialized in generates returns not before t = 2. If, for instance, bank A does not
receive IB funds in the interbank market in t = 1 when technology S is delayed it
has insuﬃcient fund available to repay dI to the impatient depositors. Since banks,
in contrast to the social planer, cannot suspend convertibility, a run on bank A is
unavoidable and the bank is liquidated.16 Consequently, following a specialization
in lending, banks expose themselves to a liquidity risk in the interbank market.
This generates the risk of spill-overs of regional liquidity shocks and cross-regional
contagion. If region B is hit by a regional shock and all investments in that re-
gion repay late while also technology S is delayed in region A,b a n kA will collapse
simply because it relies on a liquidity inﬂow from the interbank market due to its
specialization.
These ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Financial integration through an interbank market enables banks to
specialize (xA =0 ; xB =1 ) without being destabilized by sectoral shocks. However,
specialization brings about the risk of contagion.
4.3 Welfare implications
Given that ﬁnancial integration and specialization brings about the risk of contagion
it depends on the expected costs of contagion relative to the gains from specialization
whether banks prefer an integrated interbank market or not. In the instances of
ﬁnancial contagion that occur with prob. 2f banks have insuﬃcient liquidity in
t = 1 to repay d1 to impatient depositors. Both banks will be liquidated and can
only repay on average the per capital liquidity holding l0. Thus depositors expected
utility under integration and specialization is given by
EU
I =2 f (qX +( 1− q))l
I
0 +( 2 e +2 f)(qX +( 1− q))dI. (10)
Note that because banks cannot suspend convertibility an ineﬃcient liquidation
of both banks is unavoidable in case of an aggregate liquidity shortage. Thus an
16For a detailed explanation of this assumption see footnote 12.
23integrated interbank market cannot implement the constraint eﬃcient allocation
that a social planer would achieve. Consequently, the utility that an integrated
interbank market and fully specialized banks can provide is lower than the welfare
that a social planer achieves because consumption is lower in case of aggregate
liquidity shortages.




which can be rewritten as
2fl
I
0 +( 2 e +2 f)dI > 2fl
D














it is obvious that this always holds since
(e + f) > −(2q − 1)f.
Because the probability f of regional shocks is the same in both regions in our set-
up the expected welfare losses due to contagion are always overcompensated. With
an integrated interbank market each banks’ exposure to its own regional shock is
reduced by f:B a n kA, for instance, will be able to sustain a regional shock in region
A as long as technology R produces early in region B. Thus an integrated interbank
market enables banks to sustain some (but not all) liquidity shocks in their home
region, which a diversiﬁed autarkic bank could not sustain.
Consequently, while contagion increases the probability of a banking crisis in each
region by f this is completely oﬀset by a reduction in the exposure to regional shocks
in the home region. Therefore, the probability of default of a bank is unaﬀected by
ﬁnancial integration, while the expected repayments on deposits strictly increase.
Proposition 4 Since regional shocks occur with the same probability f in both re-
gions ﬁnancial integration through an interbank market is always preferable, even
though ﬁnancial contagion may occur.
245 Conclusion
When assessing the beneﬁts from ﬁnancial integration it has to be taken into account
that the greater scope for diversiﬁcation through ﬁnancial integration may foster spe-
cialization which in turn increases the need for diversiﬁcation. Thus, sticking to the
status quo of cross-country correlations of shocks does not allow to assess the costs
and beneﬁts from ﬁnancial integration. It underestimates the beneﬁts but it also
undervalues the risk of ﬁnancial contagion. This has important empirical implica-
tions. Approaches like Imbs and Mauro (2007) and Fecht, Gr¨ uner, and Hartmann
(2007) that try to assess the beneﬁts from ﬁnancial integration based on the given
cross-country correlation of shocks seem to be misleading. Empirical estimates of
the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalization should to take the endogenous impact on the
correlation structure into account.
Taken at face value our model suggests that the increase in systemic risk is
exactly oﬀset by reduced exposure to domestic shocks. Thus while individual banks’
default risk remains unaﬀected by ﬁnancial integration and specialization, the risk
of a widespread banking crisis clearly increases. In our model this does not aﬀect
welfare even if we took the generally observed negative externalities of banking
failures into account. Financial integration always improves welfare since expected
costs of banking failures remain constant while ﬁnancial integration allows to reap
the beneﬁts of specialization.
In terms of policy implications, the greater contagion risk still puts pressure on
policy makers to adjust supervisory approaches and structures to the geographical
scope of banking activities.17 While supervisory structures should develop to take
greater account of cross-border risks our analysis also suggests that ﬁnancial integra-
tion should not be resisted on stability grounds, at least not in industrial countries
with relatively well-functioning interbank markets and more limited contract en-
17See DellArricia and Marquez (2006) for a theoretical analysis of the relationship between
ﬁnancial integration and supervisory structures.
25forcement problems. In fact, greater specialization in lending to the most proﬁtable
sectors through better bank risk sharing may well enhance overall welfare without
increasing the probability of bank failures.
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